A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging
Responsibility for bid rigging lies not only with cartel members or a corrupt public official. Legislators are also responsible. This paper critically analyzes some legal rules for public tenders that may facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as publication of public entities’ reserve price, th...
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Revista de Derecho Administrativo
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoadministrativo/article/view/22857 |
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oai:revistaspuc:article-228572020-10-21T23:52:50Z A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging Concurso sin competencia: las reglas de los procedimientos de selección que favorecen las licitaciones colusorias Calderón, Andrés Cartel Competition Contest Public Procurement Bid Rigging Publicity Transparency Cártel Competencia Concurso Contrataciones con el Estado Licitaciones Colusorias Publicidad Transparencia Responsibility for bid rigging lies not only with cartel members or a corrupt public official. Legislators are also responsible. This paper critically analyzes some legal rules for public tenders that may facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as publication of public entities’ reserve price, the disclosure of the identity of contestants, contact between bidders and allowing consortiums without restrictions. Resting on comparative experience from OECD, Spain, Chile, Colombia, among others, the author proposes some reforms to favor competition in public procurement. Las licitaciones colusorias ocurren no solo por culpa de las empresas integrantes de un cártel o un funcionario corrupto. Existe un tercer responsable: el legislador. Este artículo analiza críticamente algunas reglas que guían los concursos públicos que pueden facilitar la comisión de conductas anticompetitivas, como la publicidad del valor de compra de la entidad pública, la difusión de la identidad de los concursantes, el contacto entre postores, y la permisión irrestricta de los consorcios. Basándose en la experiencia comparada de la OCDE, España, Chile, Colombia, entre otros, el autor propone algunas reformas para favorecer la competencia en las contrataciones estatales. Revista de Derecho Administrativo 2019-10-21 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion application/pdf https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoadministrativo/article/view/22857 Revista de Derecho Administrativo; Núm. 18 (2019); 66-90 2074-0956 spa https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoadministrativo/article/view/22857/21946 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 |
| elec_str_mv |
Portal de Revistas PUCP |
| collection |
Portal de Revistas PUCP |
| language |
spa |
| format |
Online |
| author |
Calderón, Andrés |
| spellingShingle |
Calderón, Andrés A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| author_facet |
Calderón, Andrés |
| author_sort |
Calderón, Andrés |
| title |
A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| title_short |
A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| title_full |
A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| title_fullStr |
A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| title_full_unstemmed |
A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| title_sort |
contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging |
| description |
Responsibility for bid rigging lies not only with cartel members or a corrupt public official. Legislators are also responsible. This paper critically analyzes some legal rules for public tenders that may facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as publication of public entities’ reserve price, the disclosure of the identity of contestants, contact between bidders and allowing consortiums without restrictions. Resting on comparative experience from OECD, Spain, Chile, Colombia, among others, the author proposes some reforms to favor competition in public procurement. |
| publisher |
Revista de Derecho Administrativo |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| url |
https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoadministrativo/article/view/22857 |
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