A contest without competition: analysis of public bidding regulations that facilitate bid rigging
Responsibility for bid rigging lies not only with cartel members or a corrupt public official. Legislators are also responsible. This paper critically analyzes some legal rules for public tenders that may facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as publication of public entities’ reserve price, th...
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | spa |
| Publicado: |
Revista de Derecho Administrativo
2019
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| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechoadministrativo/article/view/22857 |
| Sumario: | Responsibility for bid rigging lies not only with cartel members or a corrupt public official. Legislators are also responsible. This paper critically analyzes some legal rules for public tenders that may facilitate anticompetitive practices, such as publication of public entities’ reserve price, the disclosure of the identity of contestants, contact between bidders and allowing consortiums without restrictions. Resting on comparative experience from OECD, Spain, Chile, Colombia, among others, the author proposes some reforms to favor competition in public procurement. |
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