Institutional change and political conflict in a structuralist model
The article presents a theoretical model of political conflict and democratic stability in a small open developing economy, using as the basis a structuralist macroeconomic model. Political institutions are given in the medium run, but they vary in the long run as the result of political conflict be...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Texto |
| Idioma: | English |
| Publicado: |
ECLAC
2020-07-01
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11362/45733 |
Tabla de Contenidos:
- Abstract .-- Introduction .-- I. Conflicting claims in the labor market and external constraints: explaining the medium run equilibrium .-- II. Economic and political power and the stability of democracy: introducing institutional change in the structuralist model .-- III. A typology of political outcomes in the SMI when there is no structural change .-- IV. When politics go South: political instability and coups .-- V. Opening space for positive-sum games: the role of structural change .-- VI. Conclusion.